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ACCOUNTABILITY IN A SMOKE-FILLED
ROOM: THE INADEQUACY OF SELF
REGULATION WITHIN THE INTERNET
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
The online behavioral advertising industry has grown steadily in the
past twelve years as online advertisers continuously track the movements of
internet users.1 According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or the
Commission), online behavioral advertising is “the practice of tracking
consumers’ activities online to target advertising.”2 Despite the FTC’s
recommendation in 2000 for the enactment of privacy legislation to
supplement self regulation,3 the industry continues to operate under selfcreated principles authored by the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) and
the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA).4 In light of increasing privacy
concerns, the FTC stands on the cusp of a new horizon in online privacy
regulation.5
It is this note’s position that the self regulation implemented by the
online behavioral advertising industry must be supplemented with a multiprong system of FTC regulation and federal legislation in order to actively
protect consumer online privacy. The quickly expanding Internet behavioral
industry can no longer be allowed to self regulate if consumer interests are
to be effectively protected. Instead, external regulation and uniform
methods of evaluation are necessary to allow the industry to continue
growing in a controlled but productive manner. Ultimately, this note will
suggest possible solutions to existing approaches in order to create a
cohesive system of regulation and oversight.
1. See Saranga Komanduri, Richard Shay, Greg Norcie, Blase Ur & Lorrie Faith Cranor,
AdChoices? Compliance with Online Behavioral Advertising Notice and Choice Requirements,
CARNEGIE MELLON U. CYLAB (Mar. 30, 2011), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1081&context=cylab.
2. FTC, Online Behavioral Advertising Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible SelfRegulatory Principles (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf.
3. In its report, the FTC stated that “backstop legislation addressing online profiling is still
required to fully ensure that consumers’ privacy is protected online.” See FTC, ONLINE
PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS: PART 2 RECOMMENDATIONS at 10 (2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.pdf.
4. See DIGITAL ADVER. ALLIANCE, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING
(2009),
http://www.aboutads.info/resource/download/seven
-principles-07-01-09.pdf.
A number of companies engaged in online behavioral advertising
formed the NAI in 1999 as a self-regulatory organization for the industry. See Komanduri et al.,
supra note 1, at 2. The NAI proposed a set of self-regulatory principles to the FTC, which it later
published in 2001 and revised in 2008. Id. at 2–3. As of 2011, the NAI has seventy-four member
companies. Id. at 3. The DAA was formed in 2009 as the FTC began to examine online behavioral
advertising again. Id. One member of the DAA is the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB). Id.
One of the core objectives of the IAB is to “[f]end off adverse legislation and regulation.” About
the IAB, IAB, http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).
5. See Komanduri et al., supra note 1.
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Part I of this note explores the nature of online advertising and its
methods, along with the various players that participate in and shape the
industry. Part II examines the recent Google-DoubleClick merger6 by
exploring the functions of each company, as well as their synthesis through
the merger. It also delves into the response published by the FTC regarding
the proposed merger between the two companies, along with a dissent from
within the Commission. Part III discusses the inadequacy of self regulation
within the behavioral advertising industry. It also examines the downfalls of
the FTC’s method of policing behavioral advertising. Finally, Part IV
explores a multi-prong approach for a more effective method of monitoring
online advertising through a consolidation of oversight programs, a
reassessment of the technology markets, increased consumer transparency,
and stricter federal legislation.
I. THE NATURE OF THE ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
INDUSTRY
Advertisers successfully utilize the Internet to target consumers with
pinpoint precision on a level that is unattainable for advertising in other
media.7 Behavioral advertising carries a built-in incentive for the advertiser
to continue to use various tracking techniques.8 Increased surveillance and
information gathering ultimately leads to larger revenues for advertisers.9
Active advertising networks are able to construct profiles of users as they
navigate between different websites.10 The result of this tracking is that
each user is presented with advertisements that are calculated to relate to his
or her interests based on the different websites the user visits.11
6. See Elinor Mills, Google Buys Ad Firm DoubleClick for $3.1 Billion, CNET (Apr. 13,
2007, 5:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Google-buys-ad-firm-DoubleClick-for-3.1-billion/21001024_3-6176079.html.
7. See Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *2 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.
8. See Christopher Calabrese, Yes, They Really Know It’s You, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:39 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/yes-they
-really-know-its-you.
9. Id.
10. Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief at
10, Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic_complaint.pdf. Internet users primarily access Internet
content through search engines provided by companies like Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. Id. at
3. Search engine usage impacts both online decisions and offline consumer behavior. Id. The
search terms entered into a search engine may reveal “a plethora of personal information such as
an individual’s medical issues, associations, religious beliefs, political preferences, sexual
orientation, and investments monitored.” See also Komanduri et al., supra note 1.
11. J. Thomas Rosch, Chairman, FTC, Looking Backward and Forward: Some Thoughts on
Consumer Protection 13 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch
/090311backwardforward.pdf. Behavioral advertising encompasses all tracking of a consumer’s
online activities over time, including searches the consumer has conducted, the web pages visited,
and the content viewed, in order to provide tailored consumer advertising. Id. However,
behavioral advertising encompasses situations where a website allows a third party to collect data
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According to results from a study conducted by the NAI,12 behaviorally
targeted advertising in 2009 yielded 2.68 times the revenue per ad as did
non-targeted advertising.13 Based on the results, the NAI has defended
behaviorally-targeted advertising as a strong foundation and a “critical
component of ad network, publisher, and advertiser success.”14 On average,
behaviorally targeted ads are twice the price of regular advertising and tout
twice the effectiveness of normal advertising, garnering increased revenues
and spurring general Internet growth.15
A. TRANSACTIONS WITHIN THE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
MARKET
Online publishers use two methods to sell space to advertisers: direct
and indirect sales.16 Direct sales are executed by the publisher’s sales force
and guarantee a specific placement and time frame during which the
advertisement will be displayed.17 Direct sales usually involve premium
advertising space, typically considered to be at the top or upper-half of the
computer screen, of websites with large numbers of online visitors.18
Indirect sales are completed through ad intermediation firms, which collect
an inexpensive inventory of advertising space along a network of websites
for targeting users.19 Indirect sales usually involve advertising space on the
bottom half of the website or on websites with low user traffic.20

and serve advertisements to consumers, a distinction that is increasingly redundant. Id. Notably,
the FTC uses a separate definition for online behavioral advertising, which does not include
contextual advertising or first party advertising. Komanduri et al., supra note 1.
12. NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org (last visited Dec. 19,
2011).
13. See Press Release, Network Adver. Initiative, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads
More Than Twice as Valuable, Twice as Effective as Non-Targeted Online Ads (Mar. 24, 2010),
available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_Beales_Release.pdf. The NAI
commissioned and conducted a study measuring the pricing and effectiveness of behaviorally
targeted online advertising based on data from twelve major advertising networks. Id. The study
was conducted by economist Howard Beales, the former Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection at the FTC. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. According to the NAI study, the average relative cost of behaviorally targeted ads in
2009 was 2.68 times greater than normal advertising. Id. at 1. The weighted average cost per
thousand ad impressions for behaviorally targeted ads was $4.12, while the cost for normal
advertising was $1.98. Id. at 2. According to the data, behaviorally targeted ads accounted for 17.9
percent of respondents’ advertising revenue, with an increase of 3.2 percent within the year. Id. A
smaller subset of the data suggested that users who clicked on a targeted ad were more than twice
as likely (6.8 percent) to complete a transaction on the site in comparison to users who clicked on
a normal ad (2.8 percent). Id.
16. See Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *3 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.

280

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

The ad intermediation market is split into ad networks and ad
exchanges.21 While both aggregate advertising inventory, ad networks
purchase advertising inventory from multiple websites and sell this
inventory to advertisers, keeping a percentage of the revenue.22 Meanwhile,
ad exchanges create a platform where advertisers list and bid on advertising
inventory.23 Ad intermediaries use a type of targeting technology called
contextual advertising, utilizing ads consisting primarily of text that are
delivered onto a webpage through the process of scanning the site’s text for
key words.24
B. THE SELF REGULATION LANDSCAPE
The online behavioral advertising industry is part of the greater digital
advertising industry, which operates under a self-regulatory regime based
on guidance from the statements of the FTC.25 In response to the recent
increase in the scrutiny of Internet behavioral advertising and various
company practices, the DAA26 issued “Principles for Multi-Site Data,”
which were designed to “expand the scope of self regulation of online data
collection.”27 The Principles issued by the DAA are intended to build on the
industry’s existing self-regulatory standards28:
The new Principles establish comprehensive self-regulatory standards
governing the collection and use of Multi-Site Data, data collected from a
particular computer or device regarding Web viewing over time and across
non-affiliated Websites. Building on and adopting the recommendations
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3–4. Contextual advertising provides advertising based on the online content the
reader is viewing in an attempt to elicit a specific consumer response, such as the purchase of a
product or service. Id. at *5. In its investigation of the merger between Google and DoubleClick,
the FTC stated that collected evidence indicated that ad intermediation did not function as a
substitute for direct sales by publishers. Id. at *4.
25. See DAA Announces Comprehensive Principles for Online Collection of Web Data, PR
NEWSWIRE (Nov. 7, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/daa-announces
-comprehensive-principles-for-online-collection-of-web-data-133375378.html?utm_expid
=43414375-18&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct
%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved%3D0CCIQFjAA%26ur
l%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.prnewswire.com%252Fnews-releases%252Fdaa-announces
-comprehensive-principles-for-online-collection-of-web-data-133375378.html%26ei%3DY0Q6UI
vAFujw0gH82oGIBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNGkcjzMwtCAmRCvdDTwlDD-vKrRGg.
26. The Digital Advertising Alliance operates as a coalition of the nation’s largest media and
marketing associations. Id. It includes the American Association of Advertising Agencies
(AAAA), the American Advertising Federation (AAF), the Association of National Advertisers
(ANA), the Direct Marketing Association (DMA), the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), and
the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI). Id. As a cooperative effort, the DAA is designed to
develop “effective self-regulatory solutions to consumer choice in online behavioral advertising
(OBA).” Id.
27. See id.
28. See NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES: THE NETWORK ADVERTISING
INITIATIVE’S SELF-REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT 4 (2008), http://www.networkadvertising
.org/sites/default/files/imce/principles.pdf.
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by the FTC . . . . the new Principles establish a clear framework governing
the collection of online Multi-Site Data that also provides consumer
choice for the collection of such data. They also prohibit the collection or
use of Multi-Site Data for the purpose of any adverse determination
concerning employment, credit, health treatment or insurance eligibility.
The Principles also codify existing industry practices prohibiting the
collection or use of Multi-Site Data for the purpose of any adverse
determination concerning employment, credit, health treatment or
insurance eligibility. Additionally, like the OBA Principles, the Multi-Site
Data Principles provide specific protections for sensitive data concerning
29
children, health and financial data.

The DAA has announced that its Principles, as published in 2012, are
applicable to the entire Internet.30 This echoes the general industry
sentiment that online behavioral advertising should be explained more
persuasively and effectively to consumers, rather than modified or altered in
any way.31 Instead of focusing on consumer opinions expressing discontent
with the use of targeted ads based on personal browsing behavior, the
industry points to the statistical effectiveness of consumer response to
targeted advertising.32 The industry suggests a dual approach for the
survival of its self regulation.33 Aside from continuing to develop and
announce self-regulating principles of conduct, the industry aims to focus
its efforts on widely advertising the work and scope of the DAA selfregulatory program by striving to “explain the benefits of a targeted,
tailored online experience to consumers.”34

29. See DAA Announces Comprehensive Principles for Online Collection of Web Data, supra
note 25.
30. See id. The Principles are designed to increase consumer choice and control by tackling
specific protections in problem areas such as information regarding children, consumer finance,
and health records. Id. Peter Kosmala, managing director of the DAA, states that the addition of
the new Principles is directly related to recent concerns being voiced about the collection and use
of online consumer information. Id.
31. See Abbey Klaassen, Behavioral Targeting Might Scare Consumers Less if We Did Better
Job Explaining It, AD AGE BLOGS (Oct. 17, 2011), http://adage.com/article/abbey-klaassen
/behavioral-targeting-scare-consumers-job-explaining/230431/; e.g., John Gamble, The Case for
Behavioral Advertising Compliance, TRUSTE BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.truste.com
/blog/2011/09/08/the-case-for-behavioral-advertising-compliance/; J.H. Snider, Could Federal
Government Privacy Policy Kill Online News?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2011, 6:54 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jh-snider/behavioral-targeting_b_1013510.html.
32. The industry ironically discusses consumers’ negative associations with various Internet
terms, perpetuated by “fear-mongering terminology.” Klaassen, supra note 31. As an example of
this terminology, words like “tracking” and “cookie” now carry negative connotations in the
minds of consumers due to the smear campaign against online behavioral advertising. Id.; see also
Press Release, Network Adver. Initiative, supra note 13.
33. See Klaassen, supra note 31.
34. See id. In her article, Ms. Klaasen suggests some helpful ways to educate consumers about
the benefits of self-regulation. Id. One of her suggestions is an idea for a “funny campaign about
being stalked by awful ads you don’t want to see as opposed to ads you do want to see,” in order
to alleviate consumer fears. Id.
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The online advertising community stands firmly in favor of self
regulation as the best framework for the industry.35 For example, TRUSTe,
a leader in the development of privacy applications and a privacy services
vendor, is a significant supporter as it is one of the main players converting
the self-regulation principles into tangible programs, an important product
for the industry.36 The general industry sentiment is that a self-regulatory
program administered through a collaborative effort, such as the DAA, is a
superior strategy which provides better protection “against over-reaching
legislation.”37
II. THE GOOGLE-DOUBLECLICK MERGER
In April 2007, Google made its largest acquisition to date by purchasing
online ad company DoubleClick for $3.1 billion in cash.38 The acquisition
accelerated Google’s display advertising business by providing a large
network of advertisers and web publishers and boosting its banner
advertising business in comparison to rivals like Yahoo.39 The merger also
allowed media agencies and advertisers to manage integrated search and
display ad campaigns through a single centralized console, boosting system
speeds and increasing the amount of targeted advertising.40 In addition to
strengthening its competitive edge over Yahoo, Google’s purchase of
DoubleClick would also bolster its challenge against Microsoft, which had
recently launched its own search advertising system.41 Amidst reports of the
merger, it was noted that DoubleClick had been involved in a consumer
privacy scandal in the late 1990s when it attempted to combine consumer

35. Forrester recently released its report, Online Advertising Data Compliance Matters, which
was aimed at marketers and squarely advocates self regulation “for the benefit of their brand as
well as the overall industry.” Gamble, supra note 31.
36. See Press Release, TRUSTe, TRUSTe Extends Leadership Role in Mobile Privacy with
Introduction of Free Privacy Policies for Mobile Applications (Nov. 2, 2011, 9:00 AM), available
at http://www.truste.com/about-TRUSTe/press-room/news_truste_free_privacy_policies_for
_mobile_applications.
37. See Gamble, supra note 31. Companies that openly participate in the self-regulatory
system and claim to follow published industry principles also qualify for a safe-harbor provision
for their goodwill. Id.
38. See Mills, supra note 6.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. In 2001, DoubleClick was forced to shut down its “intelligent” targeting service which
anonymously tracked people online and then served ads based on personal preferences by
allowing marketers to target advertising using a database of 100 million user profiles. Id. In 2005,
DoubleClick settled state and federal lawsuits for violating the privacy of Internet users. Id. As
part of the settlement, the company was required to provide consumers with an “easy-to-read”
privacy policy, purge personally identifiable consumer information, obtain opt-in agreement from
future users, and conduct a public information campaign using 300 million banner ads.
Gwendolyn Mariano, DoubleClick Able to Settle Privacy Suits, CNET (May 21, 2002, 5:10 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-919895.html.
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online and offline data, track consumer activity, and target ads based on
user profiles.42
On April 20, 2007, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),
the Center for Digital Democracy (CDD), and the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group (U.S. PIRG) filed a complaint with the FTC, requesting
that the FTC open an investigation into the merger and halt the
acquisition.43 The joint complaint argued that Google’s activities
constituted deceptive and unfair trade practices that would injure consumers
throughout the United States.44 The complaint alleged that allowing the
merger would enable Google to operate with “virtually no legal obligation
to ensure the privacy, security and accuracy of the personal data that it
collects.”45
A. GOOGLE AND ITS FUNCTIONS
Google operates the largest Internet search engine in the United States
and also dominates the search market in Europe.46 The Google search
engine is linked to the servers which store users’ search terms in connection
with their individual Internet Protocols (IP).47 The IP identifies each
individual computer connected to the Internet.48 Prior to the merger with
DoubleClick, Google itself did not directly engage in behavioral
advertising.49

42. See Mills, supra note 6.
43. Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 10, at 11.
44. Id. The complaint argued that this constituted deceptive trade practices because the Google
homepage did not directly inform users about Google’s data collection practices; rather, the user
had to click through four links to reach the information. Id. at 9. The complaint stated that a user
was unlikely to take the time to look for this information. Id. In addition, the complaint argued
that Google’s activities constituted unfair trade practices through retention of users’ search terms
in connection with their IP address because such retention was performed without their knowledge
or consent. Id. At this time, there was no “opt-out” option for users who did not want Google to
store their search terms. Id.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id. In March 2007 alone, approximately 3.5 billion searches were performed through the
Google search engine, a number believed to be much greater now. Id. at 6. Google sites are visited
by 75 percent of Internet users in Europe, in comparison to 60 percent of users in the United
States. Id. at 6–7.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. This information is stored indefinitely by Google in connection with each unique IP
address. Id. at 7. A January 2006 poll found that 89 percent of Google users believed that search
terms were kept private while 77 percent believed that Google searches do not reveal their
personal identities, including the storing of information by unique IP addresses. Id. When a user
enters a search term, the Google server automatically records “the user’s web request, IP address,
browser type, browser language, the date and time of the request and one or more cookies that
may uniquely identify the user’s browser.” Id. This means the search terms are linked with the
user’s personally-identifiable IP address. Id. at 7.
49. Id.
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Previously, Google functioned as an ad intermediary in the advertising
market space.50 The company would sell online advertising to customers in
its capacity as a search engine provider.51 For example, when a user enters a
search term using Google, the search engine returns results along with
advertisements, which have been triggered to appear by the user’s search
term.52 Google generates “most of its online advertising revenue . . . [from]
sale[s] of advertising space on its search engine results pages.”53 In terms of
ad intermediation, Google offers its customers the AdWords54 and
AdSense55 programs, which can be individualized according to the
particular customer.56
Google allows customers to use AdWords in order to shape the service
according to their individual business needs.57 Using the service, the
customer creates an advertisement and assigns key words thought to be
relevant to their businesses.58 When the assigned keywords are entered by a
consumer, the advertisement appears next to the search engine’s generated
results, allowing a consumer to click on the ad in order to be redirected to
that website.59 According to Google, this allows AdWords customers to
advertise “to an audience that’s already interested in you,” targeting
consumers based on the content of their online searches.60 The AdWords
payment plan devised by Google further appeals to advertisers because they
are only charged when an online consumer clicks on the displayed ad and is
redirected to the advertiser’s website.61 Finally, the service also provides
advertisers with tools and reports that break down exactly how the money
spent on advertising is being used, in order to allow advertisers to target
consumers more effectively and improve ad campaigns.62
The Google AdSense program allows website clients to earn revenue by
displaying Google advertisements on their site.63 This service is free for the
participating website, since advertisers and ad networks are billed for using
the service.64 Offering the “most robust targeting of any network,” AdSense
50. Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *4 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2007).
51. Id. at *2. Search engine providers such as Google are distinct from content providers, or
publishers, because content providers also sell online advertising space either directly or
indirectly. Id. at *3.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See GOOGLE ADS, http://www.google.com/AdWords (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
55. See GOOGLE ADSENSE PRODUCT TOUR, https://www.google.com/adsense/www/en_US
/tour/ (last visited October 20, 2012).
56. Id.; see also GOOGLE ADS, supra note 54.
57. See GOOGLE ADS, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See GOOGLE ADSENSE PRODUCT TOUR, supra note 55.
64. Id.
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targets its audience through three types of advertising: contextual,
placement, and Internet-based.65 The website participates in the service by
choosing advertising space on their site and selecting types of acceptable
content.66 Advertisers subsequently bid to advertise in the available space.67
B. DOUBLECLICK AND ITS FUNCTIONS
Prior to the merger, DoubleClick was a leading provider of Internetbased advertising that operated primarily by placing advertising messages
on Internet websites.68 DoubleClick was able to track individual Internet
users who received ads served by the company through a system of stored
unique identifications.69 DoubleClick’s product “‘DART’ (Dynamic,
Advertising, Reporting and Targeting) . . . enabled advertisers to [utilize
user information recorded and stored by DoubleClick in order to] target and
deliver ads based on pre-selected criteria.”70 These criteria stemmed from
the large amount of consumer demographic information stored by
DoubleClick, which was used to execute behavioral targeting of
advertisements.71 In addition to DART, DoubleClick also operated an
advertising exchange and Performics, a search-engine marketing business.72
65. Id. Contextual advertising allows the service to display ads “related to the content of your
page.” Id. Placement targeting allows an advertiser to “target your site based on demographics,
vertical, geographic location, or URL.” Id. Internet-based advertising allows an advertiser to
display ads determined by “users’ interests and previous interactions with that advertiser.” Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 10, at 8. Its advertising is estimated to reach approximately 80–85 percent of Internet
users. Id. Its advertising customers include AOL (a Time Warner company) and MTV Networks
(a Viacom company). Id.
69. Id. at 9.
When a user is first “served” an ad, DoubleClick assigns the user a unique number and
records that number in a “cookie” file stored on the user’s computer. As that user
subsequently visits other Web sites on which DoubleClick serves ads, he or she is
identified and recorded as having viewed each ad. DoubleClick stores a user’s history
for two years.
Id.

70. See id. DoubleClick offered a product called DART, which placed banner advertisements
on websites. Id. DoubleClick marketed this product to publishers, advertisers, and corporate
customers. Id.; see also Dawn Kawamato & Anne Broache, FTC Allows Google-DoubleClick
Merger to Proceed, CNET (Dec. 20, 2007, 1:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/FTC-allows-Google
-DoubleClick-merger-to-proceed/2100-1024_3-6223631.html.
71. Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 10, at 9. Consumer information stored includes a range of data including “web surfing,
shopping cart behavior, and use of broadband video.” Id.
72. See Kawamato & Broache, supra note 70. The advertising exchange operated by
DoubleClick functioned to match advertisers looking for advertising space with advertising
networks who owned websites that are selling advertising space, in order to efficiently generate
online advertising revenue for clients. Id.
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Unlike Google, DoubleClick did not sell sponsored search advertising
space to advertisers.73 Instead, it was the leading company in the third-party
ad serving market, which functions in the delivery and tracking of online
advertisements.74 Ad server products allow publishers to manage online
advertising by tracking advertisements that generate the largest amount of
revenue—satisfying the publisher’s contractual obligations—as well as
performing various sales analyses.75 Its products also allow advertisers to
check that advertisements are sent and served by publisher sites.76 Finally,
ad server products analyze various online advertising campaigns among
different publishers.77
C. FTC INVESTIGATION OF THE GOOGLE-DOUBLECLICK MERGER
According to its official statement,78 the FTC paid particular attention
to Internet advertising activity due to a rise in customer use and the degree
of effectiveness that its communication capabilities offered.79 Google
consolidated and developed its Internet advertising to create what the
company called the “Google Display Network,”80 which included “text,
image, rich media, and video advertising on Google properties, YouTube,
and millions of web, domain, video, gaming, and mobile partner sites.”81
The Commission’s investigation in regards to the merger between Google
and DoubleClick aimed at considering its impact on competition within the
realm of online advertising.82 The Commission noted that Google “is the
dominant provider of sponsored search advertising.”83 The company
proclaimed itself to be the number one global advertising network, reaching
more than 80 percent of Internet users across the world, delivering in excess
of six billion ad impressions across hundreds of thousands of websites
daily, and touting thousands of advertisers as Google Advertising Network
users.84

73.
74.
75.
76.

See Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *3 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2007).
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
77. Id. at *6.
78. Id. at *1.
79. According to its statement, the FTC was responding to complaints and warnings that the
merger would allow the companies to combine their databases of consumer information in a way
that would infringe upon consumer privacy. Id.
80. See GOOGLE DISPLAY NETWORK, www.google.com/displaynetwork (last visited Dec. 19,
2011).
81. Id.; see CPA Performance Trends on the Google Display Network, GOOGLE, http://
static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/en/us/adwords/di
splaynetwork/GDN_Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
82. See Google/DoubleClick, 2007 WL 4624893, at *1.
83. Id. at *3.
84. See CPA Performance Trends on the Google Display Network, supra note 81.
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The Commission conducted its investigation of the merger between
Google and Double-Click under the authority of the Clayton Act, which
grants the Commission authority to review mergers and acquisitions.85 “The
standard used by the FTC to review [the merger] is set forth in Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.”86 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18, it specifically states:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.87

In pursuing its investigation, the Commission specifically targeted
transactions deemed harmful to consumers, either because sellers were able
to maintain prices that were above competitive levels for extended periods
of time or which resulted in the diminished quality of a product or service.88
In deciding to close its investigation of Google’s acquisition of
DoubleClick due to its unlikely reduction of competition, the Commission
evaluated and rejected three possible theories of harm.89 First, the
Commission did not find evidence to support the theory that the merger
would “eliminate direct and substantial competition” between the two
companies.90 Likewise, the Commission declined to accept the theory that a
merger would eliminate any potential competition in the third-party ad
server market.91 Finally, the Commission rejected the merger’s potential to
cause non-horizontal harm by allowing Google to utilize DoubleClick’s
dominance in the third-party ad server market in order to benefit its own
position in the ad intermediation market.92 In concluding its statement, the

85. See Google/DoubleClick, 2007 WL 4624893, at *1.
86. Id.; Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 62-213, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2006)).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
88. See Google/DoubleClick, 2007 WL 4624893, at *1.
89. Id. at *6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *7.
92. Id. at *10. Google’s competitors had expressed concerns that the merger would allow the
company to combine its own database of user information with data collected by DoubleClick,
thereby creating an “overwhelming advantage” in the market. Id. The FTC dismissed this concern,
basing its conclusion on the fact that information collected by DoubleClick regarding its
customers and competitors technically lies in the possession of the various publishers. Id.
DoubleClick is not the proprietor of this information. Id. DoubleClick has individual contracts
with its customer publishers which contain restrictions on the disclosure of the information
collected by DoubleClick. Id. In its statement, the FTC expressed that they believed statements
made by Google that the company would continue to honor the disclosure restrictions in the
contracts between DoubleClick and its customers. Id. Therefore, the FTC did not believe that the
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Commission summarized competitors’ qualms about the merger, attributing
their concerns to a fear of a superior Google product that could potentially
dominate the market.93 This fear was dismissed in the face of the everchanging nature of the online advertising market and its products.94 Relying
on a “snapshot of current, narrowly-drawn product categories,”95 the
Commission approved the merger in December 2007.96
D. HARBOUR’S DISSENT IN THE FTC’S DECISION TO CLOSE
INVESTIGATION
In her dissent accompanying the Commission’s statement regarding
ending its investigation, Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour pinpointed
lack of foresight as the Commission’s downfall in its analysis of the
relevant markets.97 In particular, Harbour delineated three ways in which
the activities of Google and DoubleClick horizontally overlap within the
online advertising markets, potentially resulting in decreased competition
due to the merger of the two companies.98 First, Google was in the process
of developing and beta-testing its own third-party ad serving tools, which
would eventually enter the market in direct competition with DoubleClick’s
product.99 Likewise, DoubleClick developed its own tool for ad
intermediation, which placed it in direct horizontal competition with
Google prior to the merger.100 Finally, Google’s recent implementation of
“placement targeting,” which allowed advertisers to select specific websites
for their text or image advertisements, was merely a substitute product for
DoubleClick’s display advertisement tools. Therefore, Harbour considered
the two companies to be in direct competition for customers.101 None of
these elements were analyzed in the FTC’s report regarding the markets
which Google and DoubleClick products occupied.102
E. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY AFTER THE FTC INVESTIGATION
The FTC ultimately announced that it would allow the $3.1 billion
merger proposal between Google and DoubleClick to proceed after eight
months of review for possible antitrust violations following Google’s
merger would allow Google to utilize DoubleClick’s dominance in the third party ad server
market to its own advantage in an unfair way. Id.
93. Id. at *11.
94. Id.
95. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded
Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 784 (2010).
96. Id. at 783–84.
97. See Google/DoubleClick, 2007 WL 4624893, at *12.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *13.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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announcement of the merger.103 Despite significant dissent by rivals such as
Microsoft, as well as a strongly worded dissent by Commissioner Harbour,
the Commission approved the merger in a four-to-one vote.104 Although
Google was waiting for the approval of the merger by European regulators,
it announced that “the FTC’s strong support sends a clear message: this
acquisition poses no risk to competition and will benefit consumers.”105 In
the wider scope of antitrust regulation, critics found that the FTC’s decision
corresponded to the general trend regarding treatment of vertical mergers in
the marketplace.106 The Commission’s decision comes in the face of
complaints by competitors like Microsoft that the merger would “give
Google an unfair advantage in search and publisher-based advertising
tools.”107
Subsequently, the European Commission approved the $3.1 billion
merger between Google and DoubleClick and placed no conditions on the
transaction.108 Following the Commission’s decision, Google’s chief
executive, Eric Schmidt, expressed his satisfaction:
We are thrilled that our acquisition of DoubleClick has closed . . . . With
DoubleClick, Google now has the leading display ad platform, which will
enable us to rapidly bring to market advances in technology and
infrastructure that will dramatically improve the effectiveness,
measurability, and performance of digital media for publishers,
advertisers, and agencies.109

Similar to the statement issued by the FTC, the European Commission
determined that Google and DoubleClick could not be considered
competitors in this transaction.110
III. THE INADEQUACY OF SELF REGULATION AND THE FTC
APPROACH
As the leading agency in privacy policy and enforcement, the FTC has
the task of observing and policing how technology affects American

103.
104.
105.
106.

See Kawamato & Broache, supra note 70.
Id.
Id.
Id. For the past thirty years, vertical mergers which involve companies “in adjacent
businesses and are designed to push the buyer into a new market” have been approved. Id. The
FTC has taken a stricter approach to horizontal mergers between “two companies in exactly the
same line of business,” which may function to remove a competitor. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Dawn Kawamoto, With Europe’s OK, Google Closes DoubleClick Acquisition, CNET
(Mar. 11, 2008, 8:52 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9890858-7.html.
109. Id.
110. Id. Responding to the European approval to the merger, the CDD echoed Commissioner
Harbour’s concern that “[a]n antiquated and piecemeal antitrust approach” is an inadequate
method of assessment for the privacy concerns raised in the new digital market. Id.
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businesses and consumers.111 The FTC framework consists of encouraging
companies to build privacy and security protections into new products,
simplified privacy policies, and greater transparency around data collection,
use, and retention.112 The online behavioral advertising industry relies on
self regulation, along with many other private sector industries, to establish
industry standards, develop and apply codes of professional ethics, and
secure consumer confidence.113 However, recent evaluations of the
industry’s self-regulatory efforts are garnering significant criticism.114
A. THE FAILURE OF SELF REGULATION
Contrary to the claims of the online advertising community, studies at
the University of California Berkeley School of Law and the University of
Pennsylvania have both found that the majority of U.S. residents are not
interested in receiving targeted advertising content.115 While only 35
percent of respondents agreed with jail time for executives of companies
using consumer information illegally, consumers demonstrated disinterest
in targeted advertising, which contradicted the results of an earlier study
conducted by TRUSTe, an Internet privacy services vendor.116 In addition, a
comprehensive report by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University found

111. Julie Brill, Comm’r, FTC, Privacy Implications of Social Media, Address at the U.S.–
China Internet Industry Forum (December 7, 2011) (transcript available at http://insurancenewsnet
.com/article.aspx?id=311115).
112.
Id.
113. See Daniel Castro, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., Benefits and Limitations of Industry
Self-Regulation for Online Behavioral Advertising 1 (2011), http://www.itif.org/publications
/benefits-and-limitations-industry-self-regulation-online-behavioral-advertising.
114. See Wendy Davis, Consumers Don’t Understand Opt-Out Tools, MEDIA POST (Oct. 31,
2011,
6:55
PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/161469/consumers-dont
-understand-opt-out-tools.html.
115. See Grant Gross, Survey: US Residents Don’t Want Targeted Ads, IT WORLD (Oct. 1,
2009, 10:48 AM), http://www.itworld.com/government/79438/survey-us-residents-dont-want
-targeted-ads. The Berkeley Center for Law and Technology and the Annenberg School for
Communication found that 86 percent of respondents did not want online vendors to provide
targeted ads by tracking consumer behavior across multiple websites. Id. In addition, 66 percent of
participants responded that they were simply not interested in targeted online advertisements. Id.
116. Id. TRUSTe, whose poll focused on online users, found that, while two out of three
consumers were aware that their Internet browsing information was potentially being collected by
a third party for the purpose of behavioral advertising, consumer discomfort with behaviorally
targeted advertising fell to 51 percent in 2009 from 57 percent a year earlier, “suggesting that
although consumers worry about protecting their private information online, they are growing
more accustomed to behavioral targeting, with some even preferring to be served targeted
advertisements.” Press Release, TRUSTe, Behavioral Targeting: Not that Bad?! TRUSTe Survey
Shows Decline in Concern for Behavioral Targeting (March 4, 2009), available at http://www
.truste.com/about-TRUSTe/press-room/news_truste_behavioral_targeting_survey. On the other
hand, 86 percent of the Berkeley Center respondents stated that they do not think online
advertisers should deliver targeted advertising through the use of tracking consumers across
various websites. Id. While the significant difference in results from the TRUSTe survey may be
attributed to its polling of online users, the results of the Berkeley/University of Pennsylvania
phone survey convey a general attitude of distrust from consumers. Id.
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that Internet users who wanted to actively protect their privacy and prevent
companies from tracking their online activities had great difficulty opting
out of the tracking.117 While the DAA requires ad companies to allow
people to opt out of receiving targeting advertising and notify users about
the proper process, consumer confusion is not necessarily resolved.118
As an alliance created to establish a common set of guidelines to
promote industry self regulation, the DAA has not been empirically
successful at increasing consumer transparency through easily
understandable opt-out tools.119 DAA initiatives carry no consequences,
such as fines or formal reprimands, for companies who receive a bad report
for noncompliance.120 As part of the self-regulation effort, the industry has
set up the Online Interest-Based Advertising Accountability Program to
determine whether businesses are complying with the Principles for Online
Behavioral Advertising created by the National Advertising Review
Council (NARC).121 However, NARC can only identify violators through a
combination of self monitoring and consumer complaints, relying on the
industry to police itself.122 It refers companies who fail to comply with the
Principles to the FTC and publicizes their noncompliance through a news
release.123 Meanwhile, consumer groups in the U.S. and Europe continue to
voice their dissatisfaction regarding potential data breaches as a result of
online behavioral ads.124

117. See Carnegie Mellon Report Finds Internet Privacy Tools Are Confusing, Ineffective for
Most People, EUREKALERT! (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2011-10
/cmu-cmr103111.php. The researchers at Carnegie Mellon tested nine opt-out tools, finding
serious usability flaws in each one. Id. They found that average consumers were “confused by the
instructions and had trouble installing or configuring the tools correctly.” Id. “Often, the settings
they chose failed to protect their privacy as much as they expected, or to do anything at all.” Id.
118. See Davis, supra note 114. The DAA responded to the results of the study by stating that
they were interested in transparency and meaningful choices for consumers operating in the real
world. The DAA was not concerned since “it is easy to create consumer confusion in the
laboratory.” Id.
119. Id. See Lucian Constantin, Advertisers Can’t Be Trusted to Self-Regulate on Data
Collection, Says EFF, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 16, 2011, 1:53 PM), http://www.cio.com.au
/article/407483/advertisers_can_t_trusted_self-regulate_data_collection_says_eff/.
120. Constantin, supra note 119. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) believes that no
self-regulatory program can replace proper legislation from the US Congress. Id.
121. Hayley Tsukayama, Advertisers Release First Self-Regulation Results, WASH. POST
BLOGS (Nov. 8, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/advertisers
-release-first-self-regulation-results/2011/11/08/gIQA26Cf2M_blog.html. The program was set up
in August 2011, and is overseen by the Better Business Bureau. Id.
122. Id. In its first decisions, the council examined opt-out mechanisms and asked six
companies to change their opt-out policies due to inadequacy. Id. It reported that the companies of
Forbes Media Extension, Martini Media, PredictAd, QuinStreet, Reedge, and Veruta made the
necessary changes within the mandatory two-week period. Id.
123. Id.
124. Claire Davenport, Consumers Out in Force Against Targeted Online Ads, EURACTIV
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/consumers-force-targeted-online-ads-news
-507597. Regulatory advisers and advertisers held meetings in the Hague to discuss the possible
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B. THE DOWNFALLS OF THE FTC APPROACH
The Commission’s approach to enforcement regarding consumer
privacy protection is an uncertain combination of reactive techniques and
suggested guidelines for companies.125 For example, a company that fails to
uphold its promises regarding consumer privacy may face charges of
deception by the Commission.126 In addition, the entity which results from a
merger is encouraged to clearly state its goals regarding its use of consumer
information, as well as to articulate the choices available to consumers
regarding the gathering of online behavioral information.127 Google has
recently blundered in the area of consumer disclosure with its Google Buzz
product,128 a Twitter-like platform that allowed users to share information
such as updates, photos, and videos with other users.129 This dialogue
between users was integrated into Gmail, Google’s email platform.130 The
Commission alleged that although the company had “led Gmail users to
believe that they could choose whether or not they wanted to join the
network, the options for declining or leaving the social network were
ineffective.”131 In addition, the Commission alleged that “the controls for
limiting the sharing of their personal information were confusing and
difficult to find” for users who chose to join the social network.132 Google
has discontinued the service.133
Overall, the FTC proposes a multi-level approach consisting of
enforcement of the FTC Act and other laws,134 consumer and business
dangers of online behavioral ads to consumers, as part of increasing international scrutiny by data
protection authorities on online information gathering in the form of advertising. Id.
125. See Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *18 (F.T.C. Dec. 20,
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.
126. Id. According to its statement, the FTC continues to be concerned with privacy
enforcement, which it carries out according to its powers under its traditional Section 5 authority
in order ensure consumer privacy. Id. Companies that make certain guarantees regarding
consumer privacy and then fail to uphold these promises face the danger of deception charges
brought against them by the FTC, as in the case of ChoicePoint. Id. The FTC brought an
enforcement action against ChoicePoint for failing to uphold its own stated privacy policies. Press
Release, FTC, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil
Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm. As a result, ChoicePoint settled the charges regarding data
security breaches for $10 million in civil penalties and $5 million in consumer redress. Id.
127. See Google/DoubleClick, 2007 WL 4624893, at *18–19.
128. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Google's Rollout of
Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm.
129. See Introducing Google Buzz, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/introducing-google
-buzz.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
130. Id.
131. FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. See Google Buzz, GOOGLE, www.google.com/buzz (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
134. See Prepared Statement of the FTC on Privacy and Data Security: Protecting Consumers
in the Modern World: Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 112th Cong. 16–17
(2011) (statement of Julie Brill, Comm’r, FTC).
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education regarding consumer privacy,135 and a combination of “public
workshops, reports, and policy reviews” concerning new technology and
business practices in the area of consumer privacy.136 More recently, the
Commission has focused its efforts on encouraging industry self regulation,
issuing a staff report in February 2008 regarding online advertising which
included another set of proposed principles for self regulation.137 The
Commission encourages companies to clearly inform consumers of their
activities and offer an easy opt-out method, provide reasonable security for
collected information and retain it only as long as necessary to fulfill a
legitimate need, collect express consumer consent for using previously
collected data for a different purpose, and obtain express consumer assent
prior to collecting “sensitive” data.138
The FTC insists that its only purpose in reviewing mergers and
acquisitions, such as the Google-DoubleClick merger, is the targeting of
transactions that harm competition and violate federal antitrust statutes.139 It
argues that its jurisdiction does not extend into public policy matters
beyond federal antitrust violations, such as consumer privacy and
behavioral advertising, and prefers not to set a dangerous precedent of
regulating individual companies.140 Nevertheless, the Commission
evaluated the potential harm of the Google-DoubleClick merger from a
public policy standpoint, rather than a violation of federal antitrust laws.141
The FTC frames a similar series of concerns about Google’s activities in the
context of protecting consumers’ personal information within an everchanging marketplace.142 However, in its decision to drop the investigation
of the Google-DoubleClick merger, the Commission only highlights the
dynamic nature of the new digital marketplace.143
In her dissent, Commissioner Harbour offers a prediction for consumer
privacy in the context of the convergence of Google and DoubleClick.144
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Rosch, supra note 11.
Id.
See Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *2 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2007).
Id.
Id.
See Prepared Statement of the FTC on Privacy and Data Security: Protecting Consumers
in the Modern World, supra note 134, at 1.
143. See Google/DoubleClick, 2007 WL 4624893, at *18.
While the FTC's competition and consumer protection missions focus on different types
of conduct, they share the same overall goal: that consumers obtain truthful information
about products and services that they can then use to make purchase decisions in a
competitive marketplace in which their personal information is safeguarded. This
purpose has assumed even greater importance in this dynamic, digital, and global
marketplace.
Id.

144. Id. at *15.
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Specifically, Harbour predicts the evolution of highly targeted advertising
through the combination of search information gathered by Google and
browsing information gathered by DoubleClick, resulting in both targeted
search ads and targeted display ads.145 This future combination of
information seems inevitable, when considering Google’s billion dollar
efforts to obtain DoubleClick for itself rather than allowing it to function
independently or risk its acquisition by another company.146
IV. A MULTI-PRONG APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE INDUSTRY
MONITORING
Effective behavioral advertising industry oversight can be implemented
through a process of co-regulation.147 Co-regulation would consist of a
combination of government watchdogs, official enforcement agencies, and
soft law for the purpose of providing a legal backstop for the enforcement
of self-regulation principles from within the industry.148
A. CONSOLIDATION OF REGULATORY PRINCIPLES AND OVERSIGHT
PROGRAMS
The current self-regulatory landscape of online behavioral advertising is
replete with a wide variety of proposed principles published by multiple
sources.149 This includes self-regulatory principles published and updated
by the NAI,150 as well as the proposed principles published by the DAA.151
In addition, the FTC has offered its own supplementing framework to
promote the industry’s self-regulation polices.152 The recent implementation
of the Online Interest-Based Advertising Accountability Program153 by
145. Id.
146. In effect, the merger between Google and DoubleClick creates a large compendium of
consumer information and consumer preferences, likely increasing the targeting ability of
products offered to advertisers by the combined entity. Id. at *16.
147. See generally CASTRO, supra note 113.
148. Id. at 2.
149. See, e.g., DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, supra note 4 (proposing seven “SelfRegulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising” authored by “leading industry
associations,” including the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Association of
National Advertisers, the Council of Better Business Bureaus, the Direct Marketing Association,
and the Interactive Advertising Bureau); see also Komanduri et al., supra note 1; DAA Announces
Comprehensive Principles for Online Collection of Web Data, supra note 25.
150. See Brill, supra note 111.
151. See DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, supra note 4; see also DAA Announces
Comprehensive Principles for Online Collection of Web Data, supra note 25.
152. See Brill, supra note 111. The FTC aims to encourage companies to build privacy and
security protections into new products, simplify its privacy policies for increased consumer
understanding, and create greater transparency regarding data collection, use, and retention. Id.
153. See BETTER BUS. BUREAU, ONLINE INTEREST-BASED ADVERTISING ACCOUNTABILITY
PROGRAM (2011), http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/113/documents/online-behavioral-advertising
/OAB_Procedures.pdf.
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NARC marks yet another attempt at self monitoring with the additional
involvement of the Better Business Bureau.154 Each of these programs and
manifestos relies on industry self monitoring and consumer complaints to
ensure proper functioning.155 Instead, the effort to improve implementation
of consumer privacy protections must begin with reducing unnecessary
regulations.156 Federal legislation or government action is not always the
proper or only solution.157 However, the FTC must function in a way that
informs both policymakers and the industry to create a cohesive regulatory
framework.158
B. REDEFINING NEW TECHNOLOGY MARKETS TO BOLSTER THE
FTC ANALYSIS
Starting its analysis with market definition,159 the FTC found that
Google and DoubleClick occupied distinct product markets that had no
overlap, which ended the investigation.160 One solution may be to integrate
consumer privacy issues within antitrust law by encouraging antitrust
enforcement agencies to change their analysis of new technology
markets.161 Enforcers developing the concept of a market definition as an
organizing principle would shift the framing of product markets to center on
privacy issues and consumer protection.162 Rather than perpetuating the
split of enforcement efforts between antitrust issues and consumer privacy
issues, privacy would be incorporated into the product market definition as
an aspect of competition to enhance the antitrust analysis.163
In re-examining market definitions implemented by regulatory
agencies, another approach may entail creating a new category specifically
154. See Tsukayama, supra note 121.
155. DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, supra note 4, at 17–18; see also Komanduri et al.,
supra note 1; DAA Announces Comprehensive Principles for Online Collection of Web Data,
supra note 25; Brill, supra note 111; Tsukayama, supra note 121.
156. See CASTRO, supra note 113, at 11.
157. Id. “In 2011, President Obama issued an Executive Order calling for a comprehensive
review to improve the regulatory system. As noted in the Executive Order, policymakers should
“identify and use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory
ends.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Julie Brill, the FTC Commissioner, has recently stated that the FTC’s proposals are
“intended to inform policymakers, including Congress, as they develop policies and legislation
governing privacy. Our proposals are also intended to guide and motivate industry to develop best
practices and improved self-regulatory guidelines.” Brill, supra note 111.
159. See Google/DoubleClick, No. 071-0170, 2007 WL 4624893, at *2–6 (F.T.C. Dec. 20,
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.
160. See Michael R. Baye, Dir., Bureau of Economics, FTC, Is There a Doctor in the House?
The Value of Economic Expertise in Antitrust, Remarks Consumer Protection, and Public Policy
(Mar. 28, 2008). Without finding market overlap, the FTC was hard-pressed to find negative
horizontal competitive effects, such as output restriction or price increase that would stem from
the merger. Id.
161. See Harbour & Koslov, supra note 95, at 772–73.
162. Id. at 773.
163. Id. at 773–74.
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for data markets that would identify distinctions between isolated incidents
of data collection in contrast to continuous use of consumer data over
time.164 For example, this new market definition would recognize
differences between search information collected by Google165 and browser
information collected by DoubleClick,166 and then analyze the effect of a
merger through the lens of a data market, rather than an online advertising
market.167
C. STANDARDIZATION OF DISCLOSURE ABOUT DATA COLLECTION
METHODS
An enduring principle of the FTC framework has centered on consumer
transparency.168 Consumers must be able to understand a company’s
privacy policy rather than be expected to both read and comprehend long,
complicated privacy policies.169 This is a principle also articulated by the
DAA, which has stressed consumer choice in the collection of personal
information.170 One solution to foster widespread consumer transparency
may be the adoption of a uniform privacy policy structure within the
industry.171 Standardization in the appearance of notices and disclosures
could significantly enhance the transparency of privacy policies and
advertiser accountability for the average internet user.172 Standardized
elements can help consumers understand the data collection process along
with their individual choice regarding its collection.173

164. Id. at 773.
165. See Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief,
supra note 10, ¶ 55.
166. Id. ¶ 56.
167. See Harbour & Koslov, supra note 95, at 773.
168. See Brill, supra note 111.
169. Id. One suggestion to simplify notice for consumers is to exempt “commonly accepted”
practices from the layers of notice. Id. This would allow consumers to pay attention to important
practices which they may consider an invasion of their privacy, rather than force them to sift
through an exhaustive list of company policies. Id.
170. See DAA Announces Comprehensive Principles for Online Collection of Web Data, supra
note 25.
171. See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING:
INDUSTRY’S CURRENT SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NECESSARY, BUT STILL
INSUFFICIENT ON ITS OWN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 15 (2009), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs
/CDT%20Online%20Behavioral%20Advertising%20Report.pdf.
172. The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) proposes scripting tags to identify who
is serving each advertisement, or at least a standardized beacon of some kind. Id. at 6.
173. Id. The CDT recommends that each disclosure should clearly state “which company or
companies are collecting and using personal data, including data provided by advertisers, thirdparty data suppliers, and any ad networks collecting or using relevant data along the delivery
chain.” Id.
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D. CONCRETE LIMITS ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING METHODS
THROUGH FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A push in the direction of federal legislation has recently stemmed from
the use of behavioral advertising principles by credit card companies.174
Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, chairman of the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee, has reportedly sent letters to the
Visa and MasterCard companies regarding their plans to “use data on
customer behavior to target people with online ads.”175 The credit card
companies are considering new ways to analyze and aggregate consumer
data collected every time a person uses their debit or credit card to complete
a purchase.176 This data is gathered from a wide variety of places including
social network websites, credit bureaus, search engines, insurance claims,
and DNA databanks.177 Chairman Rockefeller has recently introduced the
Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2011178 and the Do-Not-Track

174. See Jared Hunt, Plans Get Senator’s Attention, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.dailymail.com/News/201110270129.
175. Id. The Senator decided to voice his concerns after the Wall Street Journal published an
article regarding the credit companies’ plans. Id. While expressing his concern about the need for
any initiative which targets consumer behavior to be subjected to careful scrutiny, Senator
Rockefeller voiced his opinion on the inadequacy of existing privacy protections.
The privacy protections afforded to the Americans in today’s commercial marketplace
are already inadequate. . . . Plans to combine customers’ purchase data with other
personal data, such as information from social network websites, credit bureaus, search
engines, insurance claims and even DNA databanks for the purpose of targeted
behavioral advertising are unprecedented and alarming.
Id. Chairman Rockefeller requested that the companies provide specific information on the types
of information the credit cards currently gather, along with the consumer identity protections they
currently provide. Id.
176. Id. Visa and MasterCard process approximately sixty-eight billion consumer transactions
every year, which possess an enormous amount of information about consumer spending,
including “online purchases, restaurant visits, grocery shopping and vacation purchases.” Id. As
the Wall Street Journal reported, companies are looking at methods of utilizing consumer
purchase information in order to increase the efficiency of targeting customers with
advertisements. Id. While the credit card companies do not match customer names and personal
information to lists of purchase data, Visa and MasterCard aim to create anonymous profiles based
on the aggregate data. Id. In order to do this, the companies have recently sought several patents
for technology that collect this type of aggregate data and create “specific customer behavior
profiles that could be used in combination with online habits to target advertisements.” Id.
177. Id.
178. Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2011, S. 1207, 112th Cong. This bill was
ultimately not enacted. S. 1207 (112th): Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2011,
GOVTRAC.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1207 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
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Online Act of 2011179 as proposed methods for consumer privacy protection
in the face of increasing online collection of personal information.180
E. DATA SECURITY AND BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT OF 2011
The Data Security and Breach Notification Act addressed the growing
incidence of online data collection by requiring businesses and nonprofit
organizations to create strong safeguards for consumer data, alert
consumers at the time of a breach, and guide affected individuals through
the process of protecting their credit and finances.181 Had it been enacted,
the Act would have been the first piece of legislation to create a federal
standard for safeguarding a wide variety of consumer information.182 The
Act outlined concrete requirements to be implemented within one year of
enactment by all entities that own or possess data containing personal
information or have contracts with third-party entities that maintain such
data for them.183 As a piece of proposed legislation, the Act did not clarify
the various circumstances that would allow an entity to escape the
notification requirement following the discovery of a breach. It is likely that
the circumstances would have to be fact-specific, rather than the fulfillment
of a blanket checklist of requirements.184
The strength of the Data Security and Breach Notification Act stemmed
from the specificity of its requirements on all entities which store personal
information.185 Nevertheless, the Data Security and Breach Notification Act

179. Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. This bill was ultimately not
enacted. S. 913 (112th): Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, GOVTRAC.US, http://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/112/s913 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
180. See Rockefeller Questions Alarming Plans by Visa, MasterCard to Use Consumers’
Personal Information for Targeted Advertisements, INSURANCENEWSNET.COM (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?id=292950.
181. Id.
182. Id. Specifically, the company must: create a security policy regarding the personal
information it possesses, designate an officer with responsibility for management and as a point of
contact, create a process for identifying any reasonably foreseeable risks to the maintenance of the
information, create a process for taking preventive and corrective action to mitigate any
foreseeable risks, create a disposal process for personal information maintained in electronic form,
and create a standard method of destruction for personal information maintained in non-electronic
form. S. 1207 § 2(a)(2)(A)–(F). In addition to outlining strict requirements for all entities, the Act
also laid out a detailed procedure for notification in the event of an information security breach,
both of which affect the individual as well as the FTC. Id. § 3. The Act would require notification
to occur within sixty days following discovery of the breach, unless the entity could demonstrate
that such a time frame is not feasible due to various circumstances. Id. § 3(c). In addition, various
types of notification methods are outlined along with the content which must be included in each
effective notification. Id. § 3(d). As with the Do-Not-Track Online Act, the Data Security and
Breach Notification Act of 2011 similarly allows enforcement by both the FTC, as well as the
attorney general of a State. Id. § 4(b),(c).
183. See S. 1207.
184. Id.
185. See Rockefeller Questions Alarming Plans by Visa, MasterCard to Use Consumers’
Personal Information for Targeted Advertisements, supra note 180.
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was not directly applicable within the self-regulatory market of behavioral
advertising because it increased consumer protection by targeting uninvited
access to personal information.186 It did not address an advertising
company’s own behavior and usage of the personal information which it
maintains because this would not have constituted a security breach, as
defined by the Act as an “unauthorized access to or acquisition of data in
electronic form.”187
F. DO-NOT-TRACK ONLINE ACT OF 2011
The Do-Not-Track Online Act was simply designed to require the FTC
to prescribe regulations about the collection and use of personal information
obtained by tracking an individual’s online activity to supplement the
FTC’s lack of enforcement.188 The Act would have required the FTC to
establish standards for a mechanism enabling a consumer to easily indicate
his preference regarding the collection of his personal information through
online sources.189 Furthermore, it would have prohibited the collection of
personal information once the consumer enacted the appropriate mechanism
to express his preference for the information not to be collected.190 The Act
outlined a two-prong enforcement approach to implement the requirements.191
The concept of “do-not-track” has already been introduced by other
entities in the industry, such as the Mozilla and Microsoft Internet browsers,
which implemented do-not-track features in early 2011.192 Despite its
hesitations, the FTC has recently called for a tougher, universal version of
“do-not-track,” notwithstanding fears of stunting Internet innovation.193
186. Therefore, the Act does not directly address targeted advertising by advertisers and ad
networks.
187. S. 1207 § 5(1).
188. See Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011).
189. Id. § 2(a)(1).
190. Id. § 2(a)(2).
191. Id. § 3(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (B). First, it allows the FTC to enforce the Act as a
violation of a regulation under section 18(a)(1)(B) regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practice.
Id. § 3(a)(1). In the alternative, it allows the Attorney General of a state to bring a civil action on
behalf of the residents of that state if there is reason to believe that their interest has been or is
threatened by a violation. Id. §§ 3(a)(1), (b)(1). The Act outlined the availability of civil penalties,
to be determined by multiplying the number of days a person is not in compliance with the rule by
an amount no greater than $16,000, and capped at $15,000,000 for all civil actions against an
individual. Id. § 3(b)(2)(A)–(B).
192. Angelique Carson, Lawmakers Discuss Behavioral Advertising, Consumer Choice, IAPP
DAILY DASHBOARD (Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/lawmakers
_discuss_behavioral_advertising_consumer_choice. However, while the browsers allow users to
indicate their preferences, there are no regulations which require operators like Mozilla and
Microsoft to observe these preferences, which results in low levels of compliance within this selfregulatory scheme. See id.
193. See Karen Bleier, Editorial: Time to Enact Do Not Track, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2011,
8:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2011-12-11/Time-to-enact-Do
-Not-Track/51816904/1. The FTC scored a significant win against social media giant Facebook,
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Chairman Rockefeller’s Do-Not-Track Online Act attempted to act as a
stepping stone towards effective behavioral advertising regulation, despite
several dangerous ambiguities in its structure.194 This included an exception
to the prohibition on collecting consumer information,195 which would
allow a company to argue that despite the preference explicitly expressed
by an individual consumer through an appropriate mechanism, the company
is still entitled to collect personal information.196 A company might state
that it collected data in order to provide a service requested by the
individual, as allowed by the statute.197 In addition, the Act included a list
of suggested factors for FTC consideration in future analyses.198 This
proliferation of factors to be considered likend the Act to the type of
rhetoric that the Commission itself has published regarding the issues in the
field of consumer privacy and regulation.199 In particular, the addition of
these factors threatened to create unnecessary space in which to maneuver
by urging the FTC to consider the technical feasibility and costs of
implementing mechanisms that would meet the Act’s standards.

which was forced to enact certain FTC-approved privacy measures regarding its 800 million users
in late November. Id. However, “the weakness in the FTC's agreement is that it didn't establish
any guidelines about Internet tracking, the method by which Facebook collects data about its users
even when they're not on the network itself.” Id.
194. For example, the Act identified an exception to the prohibition on collecting consumer
information after the consumer has expressed this preference where “necessary to provide a
service requested by the individual, including with respect to such service, basic functionality and
effectiveness,” as long as the information retains anonymity or is deleted following the completion
the service. S. 913 § 2(b)(1). The requirement to maintain the anonymity of the information or
otherwise delete it falls squarely within the plan outlined by the Visa and MasterCard companies.
See Hunt, supra note 174. By compiling purchase information from the aggregate data of credit
and debit card use, the companies hope to create anonymous profiles in order to efficiently hone in
their online advertising and increase its effectiveness. Id. Another problematic aspect of the DoNot-Track Online Act lay in its suggestion of factors for the FTC to consider in promulgating the
desired rules and standards. See S. 913 § 2(c). The Act suggested that the FTC consider such
factors as the appropriate scope of the standards and rules it promulgates, their technical feasibility
and costs, possible mechanisms, how the mechanisms will meet the necessary standards, whether
and how information can be collected and used anonymously, and possible standards for how this
may be done. Id. The FTC already encourages companies to expressly inform consumers of their
activities and offer an easy opt-out method, provide reasonable security for collected information
and retain it only as long as necessary to fulfill a legitimate need, collect affirmative express
consumer consent for using previously collected data for a different purpose, and obtain
affirmative express assent prior to collecting “sensitive” data. Rosch, supra note 11. The addition
of congressional factors for companies to consider simply acts as an added layer to a proliferation
of layers and serves to create more leeway.
195. See S. 913 § 2(b).
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id. § 2(c).
199. Id.
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G. THE CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS 2012
On February 23, 2012, the White House unveiled a new plan to
“improve consumers’ privacy protections and ensure that the Internet
remains an engine for innovation and economic growth.”200 The plan
included a “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,” which is designed to foster
consumer trust in the online advertising industry.201 The Bill enumerates
seven personal data “rights” afforded to consumers: individual control,
transparency, respect for context, security, access and accuracy, focused
collection, and accountability.202 While the Bill is spelled out on two
succinct pages, the White House discusses its reasoning for almost fifty
pages in a well-organized, albeit repetitive, summary of consumer privacy
issues.203
Regarding the need for strong enforcement, the White House looks to
the past, citing that “the FTC has brought cases that effectively protect
consumer data privacy within a flexible and evolving approach to changing
technologies and markets.”204 Although it notes that the FTC may bring
enforcement actions in connection with “companies’ failures to adhere to
voluntary privacy commitments, such as those stated in privacy policies,”
the White House touts the need to provide incentives to develop interindustry voluntary codes of conduct.205 Similar tones of measured
recommendation are expressed regarding the need for mutual recognition206
and enforcement cooperation.207 At the time of the release, “companies that
represent the delivery of nearly 90 percent of online behavioral
advertisements, including Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and AOL have
agreed to comply when consumers choose to control online tracking.”208
One month later, the FTC asked Congress to enact privacy legislation,
which would “give consumers access to information collected about them

200. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, We Can’t Wait: Obama
Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to Protect Consumers Online
(Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, We Can’t Wait], available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-unveils-blueprint-privacybill-rights.
201. Id.; EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
202. CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD, supra note 201, at 47–48.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 29.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 31.
207. Id. at 33.
208. Press Release, We Can’t Wait, supra note 200.
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and allow them to correct and update such data.”209 A response has not been
forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to establish that the current state of self
regulation within the online behavioral advertising industry is an inadequate
system for consumer privacy protection. Due to inadequate FTC regulation
and ineffective oversight within the behavioral advertising industry,
consumer privacy continues to be an afterthought in advertising power
struggles like the Google-DoubleClick Merger. Ultimately, a system of coregulation210 must be implemented, consisting of the consolidation of
oversight programs, a reassessment of the technology markets,
standardization of consumer disclosure methods, and comprehensive federal
legislation.
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